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Abstract: Market definition is an essential ingredient to competitive and
regulatory analysis. Yet, there is significant disparity regarding the definition
of the relevant geographic market for high-capacity circuits, commonly referred to as Special Access services. Given the present debate over expanding
price regulation in this sector, the importance of market definition on the expected economic effects of regulation is worth evaluating. In this article, we
demonstrate that if geographic markets are “location specific” and supplied by
a monopolist as the proponents of regulation claim, then price regulation reduces economic welfare in all instances. That is, even with monopoly supply,
regulation offers no improvement in economic welfare, meaning the debates
over the extent of competition and profit margins in such markets are irrelevant. The effect of regulation is mostly to transfer profits from sellers to buyers, so the debate appears to be largely a squabble over rents. That said, every
$1 of transfer costs more than $1 to society, so regulation reduces welfare.
This analysis demonstrates that the present case for regulating high-capacity
services is woefully inadequate and poorly conceived.
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Introduction

Businesses and other telecom service providers, such as wireless carriers,
use high capacity “special access” circuits to provide reliable and guaranteed
bandwidth between business locations, cell phone towers and, increasingly, the
public Internet.1 The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) traditionally regulated high capacity circuits pursuant to rate-of-return and, later, price
cap regulation, but beginning in 1999 the FCC began to grant incumbent telephone exchange carriers (“incumbent LECs”) pricing flexibility on a metropolitan statistical areas (“MSAs”) basis if the incumbent LEC documented the
presence of alternative competitive facilities.2
1
See In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order,
27 F.C.C.R. 10,557, 10,558 n.1 (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Special Access Order] (“The
term ‘special access services’ encompasses all services that do not use local switches; these
include services that employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end user and
an IXC’s point of presence, where an IXC connects its network with the LEC network, or
between two discrete end user locations.”).
2
In re Access Change Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers; Interexchange Carrier Purchases of Switched Access Services Offered by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers; Petition of US West Communications, Inc. for Forbear-

(Footnote Continued. . . .)
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As with every FCC action, the FCC’s Pricing Flexibility Order had its detractors, and the efforts to reverse the decision intensified when the Obama
Administration came into power.3 The FCC finally acceded to this pressure,
and August 2012 the agency released a Report and Order which found that its
“existing collocation triggers are a poor proxy for the presence of competition
sufficient to constrain special access prices or deter anticompetitive practices
throughout an MSA.”4 Given this change of heart, the Commission took the
bold step of suspending, on an “interim” basis, its rules allowing for automatic
grants of pricing flexibility for special access services “pending adoption of a
new framework that will allow us to ensure that special access prices are fair
and competitive in all areas of the country.”5
The concept of “interim” can take on a bizarre definition in Washington,6 so
it should come as no surprise that two years after releasing this Report and
Order the Commission has yet to release its promised “new framework.”
While we have no insight as to what might be causing the delay, given the history of the docket, we can surmise that there is a significant debate on how the
Commission should define the relevant economic market for high capacity

ance from Regulation As a Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA, Fifth Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 14,221, 14,231 (Aug.
27, 1999) [hereinafter Pricing Flexibility Order], aff’d sub nom., WorldCom, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3
See, e.g., Memorandum from COMPTEL to Susan Crawford and Haley VanDyck 3–
5 (Dec. 19, 2008) (citing studies for the assertion that current prices are too high), available
at http://commcns.org/1gw2d1o; In re Ameritech Operating Cos., Letter from Thomas
Jones, Partner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, on behalf of Time Warner Telecom Inc., to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, WC Docket Nos. 06-125, 05-25
(Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://commcns.org/1pcev1R; In re Special Access Rates for
Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users
Committee: L.L. Selwyn et al., Special Access Overpricing and the US Economy: How Unchecked RBOC Market Power Is Costing US Jobs and Impairing US Competitiveness, CC
Docket No. 05-25 app. 1 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://commcns.org/1jVNfT6; PLI:
Panelists See Full Telecom Policy Plate in 2009 As FCC Adjusts to New Leadership, Administration, TELECOMM. REP. (Jan. 1, 2009) (quoting Sprint Nextel Corp. Chief Executive
Officer Dan Hesse’s call for the Obama administration to push for an overhaul of the “broken” special access regime, because it is “thwarting the deployment of broadband services”); see also Sprint Nextel Corp., Special Access Pricing, Written Ex Parte Presentation,
W.C. Docket No. 05-25, at 60 (Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Sprint Written Ex Parte Presentation], available at http://commcns.org/SHoyi0; PETER BLUHM & ROBERT LOUBE, NAT’L
REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN SPECIAL ACCESS MARKETS (rev. ed.
2009), available at http://commcns.org/RupMvF.
4
Special Access Order, supra note 1, at 10,560.
5
Id.
6
OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 9, available at
http://commcns.org/1hrXkSe (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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circuits for purposes of this new competitive analysis.7 For example, many
suppliers of special access argue that the market for high capacity circuits
should be national.8 In contrast, proponents of price regulation for high capacity circuits (generally, purchasers of high capacity circuits) argue for narrow
market definitions, such as a building or cell tower.9 Other studies propose

7
George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 343, 381–82 (2011) (noting that “the
central problem of market definition derives from the confusion between the geographic
market for purposes of economic analysis (e.g., HHI calculations) and the administrative
market for purposes of regulating or deregulating prices”); see also George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Set It and Forget It? Market Power and the Consequences of Premature
Deregulation in Telecommunications Markets, PHX. CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 18 (2003),
available at http://commcns.org/1nNCArU, reprinted in 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 675 (2005).
8
See, e.g., In re Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from
Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services, July 23, 2008
Petition of AT&T, WC Docket No. 06-125, at 5 (“[B]broadband competition is national in
scope and is not limited to . . . the territory of any specific BOC.”); In re Petition of the
Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § l60(c) From Title II and
Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Their Broadband Services, March 10, 2004 Reply
Comments of Verizon, WC Docket No. 04-440, at 18 (“[I]t is appropriate for the Commission to focus on national data, and that is all the more true given that national patterns with
respect to broadband availability and competition hold true throughout our service areas.
Therefore, reliance on national data in the [sic] context is justified.”).
9
See infra note 25.
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multiple definitions,10 meanwhile others simply choose to avoid the issue altogether.11
Much of the disagreements on market definition stem from the fact that
there are effectively two types of market definition for purposes of regulating
high capacity services. First, there is the “economic” market, whose boundaries are determined using the standard economic approach.12 According
Kaserman and Mayo, the “economic market”:
[I]nvolves identification of a group of buyers and a corresponding
group of sellers whose purchase and output decisions determine the
equilibrium price. Moreover, these groups must be delineated across
both geographic and product space. In other words, market definition
requires the identification of both geographic and product boundaries
that separate buyers and sellers whose actions influence price from
buyers and sellers whose actions do not influence price. The market

10 For example, the NRRI fails to define the relevant economic geographic market. At
first, the NRRI Study claims to “estimate HHI for each MSA.” BLUHM & LOUBE, supra
note 3, at 40. However, on the next page, the authors calculate an HHI for the “nation” and
then “by city.” Id. at 41. The authors also observe that “there is considerable geographic
variation from city to city” and that the “level of competition varies by location.” Id. at 46,
79. Finally, the authors recommend that the FCC “adopt a finer (more granular) [geographic] scale in making decisions about the competitiveness of special access markets.” Id.
at 91. In so doing, the authors recommend that regulators consider the possibility that markets for high capacity services may be a “building” or “city block[],” or perhaps requiring
GIS software to measure geographic market boundaries. Id. at 88, 93–94. Not all of these
options can simultaneously be legitimate definitions of the “geographic market,” and without such a defined market, there can be no meaningful calculation of market concentration.
While most of the calculations of the HHI in the NRRI Study are at high level of aggregation (city, MSA, or nation), the authors suggest throughout the Report that Special Access
markets are in fact very small. The narrow geographic markets are further stressed, with the
authors stating, “[g]eographic differences in concentration can identify particular areas
where existing policies are succeeding or failing, and that in turn can suggest policy refinements,” or “[g]eographic price differences can identify areas where competition is sharpest
and can lead to more effective regulatory policy.” Id. at 86. Furthermore, they argue that
“finer” market definitions “could more accurately identify the boundaries of special access
competition.” Id. at 91.
11 The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in particular avoids the term “market” altogether, using “area” in its place. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-80, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO MONITOR AND DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPETITION IN DEDICATED ACCESS SERVICES (2006)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80)], available at http://commcns.org/1nNCIaY.
12 Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated
Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1984).
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definition exercise is one of the (if not the) most important aspects of
many antitrust cases . . . . 13
Definition of the economic market involves clear delineation of both the product and geographic boundaries of exchange. Only after such delineation can
one compute a concentration index and then make claims about the presence or
lack thereof of market power.
In contrast, the “administrative” market relates to the application or removal
of regulatory rules.14 An administrative market may contain many economic
markets, or may be a subset of an economic market (for instance, special
treatment for the poor or handicapped within an economic market). Administrative markets are not bound by the criteria for defining an economic market.15
Delineation of the administrative market relates to minimizing the cost or
maximizing the benefits of a particular regulatory regime.
The distinction between economic and administrative markets is plain in the
FCC’s Pricing Flexibility Order,16 where the administrative market was selected as the Metropolitan Statistical Area or “MSA.”17 In that decision, the
FCC acknowledged that economic markets are likely smaller than the MSA,
but chose the MSA as the geographic scope to which regulatory decisions
would apply.18 This decision was based largely on administrative concerns. As
stated in the Order, “the geographic area that . . . should [be] use[d] for purposes of reviewing requests for pricing flexibility” should be defined “narrowly enough so that the competitive conditions within each area are reasonably similar, yet broadly enough to be administratively workable.”19 Plainly, the
agency never defined the economic market to be the MSA20 and recognized
that the MSA consists of many economic markets. The D.C. Circuit upheld
this choice.21 Alternative proposals to grant pricing flexibility at the wire cen-

13 DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 111 (Daryl Fox et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis in original).
14 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259; see also WorldCom, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
238 F.3d 449, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the FCC’s decision to set the geographic
bounding of the market so as to administrative workability).
15 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259 (noting the importance of defining
geographic areas “broadly enough to be administratively workable”).
16 See generally id.
17 Id. at 14,260; WorldCom, 238 F.3d at 461.
18 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 14,260 (limiting the MSA to functioning as a tool for measuring the extent of
competition).
21 WorldCom, 238 F.3d at 461.
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ter level, for example, are also based on administrative convenience rather than
a formal geographic market definition.22
While there are two distinct markets relevant to the price regulation of high
capacity services (i.e., administrative and economic), the economic analysis of
competition for high capacity services should focus on the economic market,
not the administrative market. Economic analysis does offer insight on the selection of administrative markets, and the competitive and administrative
analyses are related; however, the objective functions differ between the two
markets requiring disparate conceptual frameworks.23 It is important for proposals and analyses to distinguish which market is being analyzed, so the relevant economic models are properly selected.
We recognize that there is a dispute about the geographic scope of the economic market. Consequently, in this article we choose sides so as to trace out
the theoretical implications of market definition. Assuming arguendo that the
proponents of price regulation of high capacity circuits are correct in their argument that the market for high capacity circuits is geographically narrow,24
we get a surprising and highly policy-relevant result: price regulation of high
capacity circuits would necessarily reduce economic welfare and likely reduce
investment in new broadband facilities. There are in fact no trade-offs to consider and the extent of competition (or monopoly) essentially plays no role in
the welfare analysis of price regulation for high capacity services. That is, even
if high capacity services are provided by a monopolist, price regulation offers
no increase in economic welfare.
We obtain this result because if the market for high capacity circuits is regarded as a “particular customer’s location”25 served by a monopoly provider,
then high capacity services constitute a “bilateral” monopoly—i.e., a market in
which there is only one seller and one buyer (with perhaps unequal bargaining
power).26 The welfare analysis in this setting is nothing like the standard, text-

BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 93–94.
Compare Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259 (including an administrative oversight as a factor in defining the scope of the market), with KASERMAN & MAYO,
supra note 13, at 111 (defining market as requiring the identification of “geographic and
product boundaries that separate buyers and sellers whose actions influence from price”
from those whose actions do not).
24 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 383.
25 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI. Inc., Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R 18,433, 18,449 (Nov.
17, 2005).
26 Glossary
of Statistical Terms: Bilateral Monopoly/Oligopoly, OECD,
http://commcns.org/1mvfIxZ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (“A bilateral monopoly/oligopoly is
a situation where there is a single (or few) buyer(s) or seller(s) of a given product in a mar22
23

(Footnote Continued. . . .)
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book case of monopoly, where the monopolist seeks to raise price by restricting output. In a bilateral monopoly where one item is exchanged, there is no
deadweight loss of monopoly, and the seller cannot reduce output to raise price
and profits. Each circuit transaction is unique, and is either sold or left fallow,
because there can be no arbitrage in location-specific markets. In such a setting, granting a seller pricing flexibility will result in welfare maximizing
transactions because the monopoly seller does not have the incentive to restrict
output. Price regulation in this scenario (typically) reduces the quantity of
transactions and (always) reduces economic welfare by either forcing welfarereducing transactions or blocking welfare-improving transactions. Accordingly, if the underlying assumptions regarding market definition set forth by
proponents of price regulation for high capacity services are correct, then a
policymaker interested in maximizing economic welfare should seek to expand, not contract, pricing flexibility for these services.
Our findings are significant because if markets are, in fact, geographically
narrow, then many of the traditional arguments for price regulation of high
capacity circuits are off point. For example, in a bilateral monopoly setting,
regulation reduces welfare even under monopoly supply. Thus, the debate over
whether the market is monopolistic or competitive is irrelevant. Similarly, rate
of return calculations made from regulatory account data (i.e., the FCC’s ARMIS data), which are of dubious merit in any case,27 are irrelevant since regulation in such a setting unambiguously reduces welfare irrespective of the effect
on returns.28 Finally, comparisons of prices across regulated and deregulated
areas say little to nothing about whether regulation improves welfare, since
regulation is not welfare improving.
If the proponents of regulation are correct in their assertion that markets are
“location specific,” then we must conclude that much of the debate over pricing flexibility is not a debate about economic welfare or a new “national
broadband strategy,” but rather a squabble over the distribution of rents between buyer and seller.29 High capacity circuits are in fact sold from one busi-

ket. The level of concentration in the sale of purchase of the product results in a mutual
interdependence between the seller(s) and buyer(s).”).
27 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345.
28 For examples of studies that try to use ARMIS data to calculate rates of return, see
the studies put out by the National Research Institute and the Free Press. See, e.g., BLUHM &
LOUBE, supra note 3, at 93–94; S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, DISMANTLING DIGITAL DEREGULATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY 57–59 (2009) available at
http://commcns.org/1h6M2Zh.
29 As Cass Sunstein—President Obama’s former “regulatory czar”—once observed,
“the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing are based not only on neoclassical eco(Footnote Continued. . . .)
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ness to another (and usually, from one telecom provider to another). While
shifting the gains from trade from one firm to another may seem innocuous to
some, such shifts have welfare impacts in the bilateral monopoly context, and
it is the role of a regulatory cost-benefit analysis to maximize overall welfare
and not simply maximize the profits of one industry segment. Our analysis of
the market for high capacity circuits, based on the arguments of regulatory
proponents, indicates that it is price regulation, not monopoly, which creates a
deadweight loss.
Importantly, our conclusions hinge on a particular view of high capacity
services, but this view is based on the characterizations of those pushing for
heightened regulation of the sector. This analysis is not comprehensive, as we
ignore some strategic behaviors many—including us in our prior work30—
claim are prevalent. That said, price regulation is probably a poor solution to
such strategic behavior even if it exists, given the difficulty of implementing a
solution that is, on net, beneficial. “Effective” regulation is an elusive goal.
Finally, we make no claim about the overall performance of the market.
Whether high capacity services markets are competitive or not is beyond the
scope of this article, although we believe that the available evidence is insufficient to reach a conclusion on that point.31 Our goal in this article is simple—
what are the expected welfare effects of price regulation if high capacity circuits are sold by a monopolist in very narrow markets? The answer is “not
good.”
In Section II below, we present our economic model. To help the reader
grasp better that theoretical discussion, we provide a numerical example (or
simulation) in Section III. Conclusions are found in Section IV.
II. The Welfare Effects of Price Regulating High Capacity Circuits
Consistent with prior research, it is our view that all regulation should be
subject to a cost-benefit analysis that focuses upon the welfare effects of that
regulation and tries to account for the administrative burdens and unintended
consequences of intervention. In this Section, we analyze the welfare effects
nomics, but also on an understanding of human cognition, on democratic considerations,
and on an assessment of the real-world record of such balancing,” CASS SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 9 (2002). Sunstein argued
that using cost-benefit analysis will stop interests groups from “fending off desirable regulation or pressing for regulation when argument on [their] behalf is fragile.” Id.
30 See T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantity-Discount Contracts As a Barrier to Entry,
PHX. CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 20, at 2–5 (2004), available at http://commcns.org/1raO66q.
31 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 344.
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of subjecting to price regulation a monopoly provider of point-to-point high
capacity circuits.
We recognize that many might regard our initial assumption of monopoly
and narrow markets as dashing headlong into a minefield. For well over a
decade, parties have debated whether the market for high capacity circuits is
competitive or not, as well as the type of proxies or “triggers” that might be
used to determine whether the market is competitive or contestable. In addition, the geographic scope of regulation (and later de-regulation) has been
heavily debated, with many asserting that the geographic market for these
services is far more granular than the FCC’s MSA-wide approach.
Our approach to analyzing this problem takes a side in that we adopt the arguments of those calling for more, not less regulation. We seek an answer to
one very specific, yet highly illuminating question: if the relevant geographic
market for high capacity services is a highly location-specific point-to-point
market, and if there were only a monopoly provider of such circuits, then
would price regulation advance economic welfare? The analysis in this Section shows that the answer to this question is surprisingly “No.”

A.

Two Key Assumptions: Point-to-Point Geographic Markets and
Monopoly Source of Supply

The core part of our welfare analysis is to assume that high capacity services are sold by monopoly providers in highly granular, point-to-point geographic markets. In this Part II.A, we describe the basis and utility of proceeding with these assumptions.
The point-to-point assumption of our analysis is not altogether a radical approach, as a common theme in the criticisms of the FCC’s approach to deregulation of high capacity services regards the choice to deregulate at the level of
MSA. Critics claim that the MSA is too large a collection of the narrower
geographic markets, since competition may differ considerably across the
component markets.32 In fact, many have contended that the geographic market is simply the connection between any two points.33 The geographic scope

BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 91.
In re Applications of NYNEX Corporation, Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corporation, Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 20,015–17 (Aug. 14, 1997); see
also
BellSouth
Transport
Special
Access
(SPA)
Products,
AT&T,
http://commcns.org/1nruXJk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Point-to-Point Services, CINCIN32
33

(Footnote Continued. . . .)
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of the market is, as some argue, the end user’s location. For example, the
wireless carrier Sprint, a vocal advocate for the regulation of Special Access
services, observes “that, as a theoretical matter, the relevant geographic market
for loops and transport is the geographic area served by a route connecting the
two points that a purchaser seeks to link with the dedicated facility (e.g., customer premises and central office, or central office and access tandem).”34
Others echo the sentiment, claiming that the geographic market for high capacity services is “route connecting the two points that a purchaser seeks to link
with the dedicated facility” or “a given location or for a given facility.”35 The
FCC has reached a similar conclusion, concluding that “the relevant geo-

NATI BELL,

http://commcns.org/1onyPNF (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
Sprint Written Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 3, at 59.
35 In re International Comparison and Consumer Survey Requirements in the
Broadband Data Improvement Act, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Inquiry
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, As Amended by the
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comments of Cavalier Telephone, LLC to NBP Public
Notice #1, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, at 5 (Nov. 5, 2009) (“Special access facilities are generally dedicated circuits that connect an end-user facility, such as a building
in a business district, to another facility or POP, without routing through a local exchange
switch.”); In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers; AT&T Corp.
Petition for Rulemaking to Reform Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates
for Interstate Special Access Services, Comments of Sprint Nextel Corporation, W.C.
Docket No. 05-25, at 15 (Aug. 8, 2007) (“The relevant geographic market for special access, therefore, is the geographic area served by a route connecting the two points that a
purchaser seeks to link with the dedicated facility (e.g., cell site and central office, or central
office and access tandem).”); Response Testimony of Don J. Wood at 13, In re Joint Application of Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. for Approval of Agreement and Plan
of Merger, WUTC Docket No. UT-050814 (Sept. 9, 2005) (“the market also depends on
aggregate end user demand at a given location or for a given facility.”); Declaration of Ajay
Govil on Behalf of XO Communications, LLC at 7, In re Minnesota Public Utilities Inquiry
Regarding the Petition of Qwest Corporation, Filed with the Federal Communications
Commission, for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 160(c) in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul Minnesota Metropolitan Statistical Area, MPUC Docket No. P421/CI-07-661 (Aug.
16, 2007) (“A loop facility is dedicated to the use of one customer or in limited instances a
very small group of customers.”); Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC), VERIZON,
http://commcns.org/1raOguF (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (“As demand in network capacity
continues to increase to support high bandwidth services and when bandwidth requirements
between two locations are very large, Optical Wave Service may be your preferred solution
for interconnectivity.”); In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,175 (Aug. 21, 2003) (“impairment analysis
should be applied on a customer-by-customer location basis.”).
34
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graphic market for wholesale special access services is a particular customer’s
location . . .”36 In its Pricing Flexibility Order, the FCC explicitly embraced
the legitimacy of a more narrow market definition, admitting it “might produce
a more finely-tuned picture of competitive conditions . . .”37 Likewise, the
agency also observed that it would not delay “regulatory relief until access
customers have a competitive alternative for access to every end user,” again
suggesting a view of a more narrow market definition than the MSA.38
In its recent study, NRRI echoed the sentiment and “recommend[ed] that the
FCC adopt a finer (more granular) scale in making decisions about the competitiveness of special access markets. [NRRI’s] recommendation applie[d]
with particular force to channel terminations.”39 The study stated that the FCC,
in one of its earlier decisions, had “simply and unambiguously” defined the
geographic market for high capacity services as a “particular customer’s location.”40 As alternatives to MSA level flexibility, NRRI proposed a geographic
unit of measurement of a city block, and possibly using even GIS mapping to
set narrow market boundaries for the computation of market share statistics.41
Whether the actual geographic (economic) market for high capacity services
is a “particular customer’s location” is debatable, though widely accepted. As
such, we do not challenge this definition of the geographic market in this article; rather, we base our modeling assumptions on it. Such an approach seems
reasonable, since this definition of the “market” is consistent with the position
of those proposing more strict regulation of high capacity services. As a result,
we study the welfare impact of price regulation in a geographic market defined
to be a particular customer location.
The other key assumption of our model is that point-to-point high capacity
circuits are provided by a monopoly. A central feature of the advocacy in favor
of stricter regulation focuses upon the purported lack of competition in the
provision of high capacity services. For example, the wireless carrier Sprint
asserts that for the majority of lower-capacity services, special access customers do not have competitive alternatives to the price cap LECs’ offerings.42
Likewise, the wireless carrier T-Mobile, another advocate for regulating Spe-

36 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,446 (Nov.
17, 2005).
37 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,260.
38 Id. at 14,298.
39 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 91.
40 Id. at 92.
41 Id. at 94.
42 Sprint Written Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 3, at 18.
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cial Access prices, claims that price cap ILECs are the “sole source” of high
capacity services at nearly all of its cell sites.43 The GAO study on high capacity services summarizes data showing that only 6% of buildings with DS1 or
greater demand have a competitive alternative, though this number was much
higher for locations with DS3 or higher demand levels.44 According to NRRI’s
study, “ILECs still have strong market power in most geographic areas, particularly for channel terminations and DS-1 services.”45 In both of these two
studies, however, the authors explicitly recognized that the extent of competitive alternatives for high capacity services is exceedingly difficult to measure.
There are no centralized databases of competitive alternatives, and the “absence of evidence” is not “evidence of absence.” A more rigorous analysis of
high capacity services than has occurred to date is required to understand fully
the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention.
We suspect the debate over the extent of competition for high capacity circuits will continue unimpeded, but it is beyond the scope of this article to reject or embrace the legitimacy of the monopoly or competitive claims.46 Indeed, we believe that our welfare analysis of subjecting a monopoly supplier to
price regulation is a liberating approach, because it shows that debates over
market structure and actual versus potential competition are largely irrelevant.
Simply stated, if price regulation fails to improve welfare, even if one assumes
a monopoly, then the prospects for beneficial regulation in more competitive
structures are exceedingly grim.
We turn now to the evaluation of the effects of regulation under the conditions outlined above—customer-specific markets and monopoly supply. Our
analysis reveals that this combination of assumptions introduces an interesting
wrinkle to the analysis of regulation and pricing flexibility. In particular, if the
market is a “particular customer’s location” as the FCC has concluded in some
contexts and as proponents of price regulation appear to argue, then there is
only one buyer at each location.47 For example, there is only one buyer at a
carrier’s cell tower. It follows, then, that there is one seller and one buyer, that

43 In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of TMobile USA, Inc., WC Docket No. 05-25, at 6 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at
http://commcns.org/1waMnyb.
44 GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80), supra note 11, at 19.
45 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at iii.
46 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345.
47 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,449 (Nov.
17, 2005).
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is, there is a “bilateral” monopoly.48 Bilateral monopoly does not pre-suppose
equal bargaining power, and such power may be strongly asymmetrical.49
Nevertheless, this bilateral monopoly provides an important caveat to the ordinary analysis of deregulation and its welfare consequences.
B.

Regulation and Bilateral Monopoly

We consider the following stylized, yet practically relevant scenario. Suppose that a potential seller could choose to install equipment at a certain location, which is differentiated from all other locations (to some degree) by space.
This location could be considered a wire center, tandem, or other network
node.50 Radiating from this office are numerous potential “branches,” which
are also spatially unique and have non-zero costs. For present purposes, we can
take these to represent channel terminations, a stylized arrangement illustrated
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Stylized Network

Node
(e.g., Central
Office)

Branch
(Chan Term)

Customer
Location

The decision of the firm to locate, or not locate, at this node, as well as
whether the firm provides certain branches off the node, involves several considerations. First, consistent with the arguments of regulatory proponents, the
seller, S, has a small “spatial monopoly” in the sense that no other seller would

48 See generally Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly,
55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989) (analyzing the bilateral monopoly).
49 Id. at 836–37.
50 Wire centers and tandems are points of traffic aggregation in the telecommunications
network. Local distribution plant (e.g., loops) connects to the wire center, and wire centers
are connected either directly or through tandems.
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be able to precisely duplicate that location. Second, because of the spatial
uniqueness of the branches, there exists a countervailing power on the part of
potential buyers of these connections. In particular, we will imagine that, for a
given circuit, there is only one potential buyer. Finally, there may well be
some substantial sunk cost to the seller arising from installing the necessary
capital equipment at this node. We denote these sunk costs to the seller by K at
the node, and deal with branch costs later.
We first focus on the transactions involving the transfer of control of a
branch from seller to buyer. Clearly, both the node decision and branch transactions are motivated by potential returns to the required investments, which
returns depend on the form of any regulation of connection prices that may
apply, as well as the valuations of these services by buyers, along with variable
costs. Formally, at any given node, there is a “large” collection of i branches,
each of which are bilateral monopoly markets containing the potential seller,
denoted S, and a potential buyer at branch i, denoted Bi. The branch is a single,
indivisible good, denoted Xi. Our interest focuses on those situations in which
the use of Xi may be transferred from S to Bi, and the prices under which this
transfer might occur.
The assumption of a single, indivisible good is for expositional purposes
alone. At any given location, multiple circuits may be exchanged (for example,
a few T1s). This “divisibility” of the circuits does not change the basic conclusion of the analysis. The only requirements for our results, as far as this issue
is concerned, are that (1) there exists bilateral monopoly and, (2) there is freedom of pricing/contract terms between buyer and seller. In the case where several smaller circuits could do the job of a larger one, the final transaction will
transfer precisely that collection of elements which generates the greatest gains
from trade, since this result provides the largest pool of benefits over which
the buyer and seller can negotiate. In other words, it makes no material difference whether what is being sold is literally a single, indivisible object or not.
Assume only one unit of X is transferred (i.e., a circuit). Let bi be the potential buyer’s reservation price (valuation) of Xi, and let si be the seller’s reservation value of Xi. Let ci be the cost of the transfer of the use of Xi from S to Bi,
where ci > 0 (the transfer is not free). We assume that these values are unknown to the regulator who must, for practical reasons, establish a single statutory price for elements Xi, where i = 1, 2, … N.
For any given branch, the potential gains from trade are just bi - si - ci, and,
when those gains are positive, one expects that negotiation between the parties
will result in a transfer. For example, if the buyer’s reservation value is $100,
the seller’s reservation value $50, and the cost of transfer is $10, then the gains
from trade are $100 - $50 - $10 = $40. In the absence of some barrier to trade
and in the absence of price regulation, we will see transfers in all markets from
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which positive gains are the result. There is no reason not to trade when there
are gains from it, regardless of market power on behalf of either buyer or
seller. It may be the case the seller captures most of the gains from trade, or
maybe the buyer captures the bulk of the gains, but this distribution is irrelevant to measuring total welfare. The trade occurs, and society captures the
gains from trade.
To see the uniqueness of this case, we note the following. First, in the absence of regulation, trade occurs whenever bi - si - ci > 0. All gains from trade
are realized by the parties, and welfare (in a partial equilibrium sense) is
maximized. In contrast, under any regulatory mechanism that produces a single price r*, even when that price is judiciously selected to maximize welfare
(which, in practice, is never the case), some beneficial sales will not occur and
some welfare-reducing sales will occur. The implication is that there will be
lower welfare, fewer transactions, and lower investment.51
For example, if the seller is not required by regulation to complete every
transaction desired by the buyer, then regulation reduces the number of transactions and welfare. Consider the following scenario. First, let r* < bi, so the
buyer wants to exchange. Second, let r* < si + ci, where the regulated price is
set below cost. Third, let bi > si + ci, implying a deal outside of regulation
could be reached. In this scenario, the seller refuses to transact, even though
the transaction would occur and generate surplus in the absence of regulation.
Assume now that a seller is forced to make any exchange that a buyer desires. Sales will occur only when r* < bi. In instances where si + ci > bi, the
resulting transfer is value destroying in that the price is less than the cost of
provision, even though the buyer wants to proceed.52 Under a mandate to sell,
therefore, there may be sales that are welfare reducing. There may also be
sales that do not occur, but should. Suppose, for example, that si + ci < bi (both
parties want to exchange), but r* > bi (the regulated price exceeds the buyer’s
reservation price). In this case, the regulated price is too high for this given
pairing to occur, even though both the buyer and seller would wish it to happen.53 Again, regulation reduces welfare, even if, at very low regulated prices,
transactions may increase. We note that forcing the seller to make unprofitable
51 These conclusions are based on the assumption that regulation induces some inefficient transactions, else regulation has no effect at all.
52 For example, let b = $60, s + c = $70, and r* = $50. No trade would occur absent
i
i
i
regulation, but with regulation the gain from trade is -10 (a social loss).
53 For example, let b = $60, s + c = $50, and r* = $70. The buyer does not wish to
i
i
i
make this transaction even though, without regulation, the buyer and seller would be willing
to do a deal at a price of, say, $55. If there is significant flexibility to reduce prices, then
this case will not generally occur even under regulation.
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transactions is likely to meet some resistance, such as procedural delays, regulatory squabbles, and so forth. If so, resources are wasted fighting over transactions.
This analysis reveals that unless there is some barrier to trade, in the absence of regulation the expectation should be for buyer and seller to implement
first-best, welfare optimal transactions, even under monopoly. It is true that
one party may prefer a lower or higher price, but this preference is simply a
squabble over rents and has no effect on total economic welfare. The point is
made plain by Blair, Kaserman and Romano in their seminal work on Bilateral
Monopoly:
[N]egotiation must lead to the maximization of joint profits if the
firms are to be on the contract curve. *** Regardless of how it is
determined, it is important to note that the price of the . . . good does
not serve as a rationing device. Instead, it is merely a means of dividing the joint profits.54
In contrast, under price regulation that establishes either a single price, or a
price cap, there can be market pairings under which inefficient transactions
occur, or efficient ones are ruled out.55 In the remaining cases, in which private
interests align with the regulated price, regulation provides no social benefit,
since the transaction would occur anyway under negotiation.56 Regulation
merely forces a transfer from seller to buyer, but the gain to the buyer is equal
to the loss to the seller. Consequently, regulation only reduces the number of
transactions and is, by definition, welfare reducing. There is no net gain from
regulation.
This analysis is exceedingly important to the debate over special access
pricing flexibility and is unique in some ways. Ordinarily, regulatory intervention is undertaken to provide something that the unregulated market process
does not.57 With regard to price regulation, the standard view is that judicious
price regulation can eliminate welfare losses,58 but this view is based on a variable quantities framework where homogeneous units are sold to atomistic consumers in a centralized marketplace. Whether regulation successfully does so
in practice is debatable, but that debate is irrelevant here.59 In this analysis, we
Blair, supra note 48, at 839.
KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY 19 (1991).
56 Blair, supra note 48, at 834–35.
57 TRAIN, supra note 55, at 1.
58 Id. at 2–3.
59 See generally George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
The Case of Electricity, 5 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1962); THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L.
54
55

(Footnote Continued. . . .)
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show, under market conditions consistent with pro-regulation advocacy and
some FCC decisions, that price regulation can be expected to reduce economic
welfare even when it is well intentioned and administratively costless to implement. Consequently, price regulation for high capacity services reasonably
described in this manner should be avoided. In fact, at a time when many claim
that flexibility should be reduced,60 this analysis suggests that pricing flexibility should be extended to the entire class of offerings that plausibly meet the
“particular customer’s location” view of geographic market definition.
Additionally, while increased regulation is often causally linked to reduced
investment and welfare, neither theory nor empirics generally support this
causal relationship.61 Certainly, regulation done poorly, as is often the case, can
reduce investment levels, output, and welfare.62 Theoretically, though, regulation may increase investment and welfare; it depends on the nature of the regulation. The Averch-Johnson effect, for example, implies that firms will overinvest in capital equipment in order to increase the absolute level of profits.63
Regulation, then, increases investment, but to inefficient levels (and possibly
inefficient capital-to-labor ratios).64 Price cap regulation intends to resolve this
defect, thereby increasing efficiency and welfare.65 However, to do so, the
regulation reduces investment.66
In the standard, variable quantities, central market analysis typical of theory
and policy debates, regulation has an unambiguous relationship to welfare,
transactions, or investment.67 Contrariwise, in the presence of bilateral monopoly and a fixed quantity, regulation unambiguously reduces welfare and the
number of transactions,68 which reasonably implies a reduction in the investment level. In this regard, “special” access may, in fact, be truly special.

SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS
(1997).
60 GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80), supra note 11, at 19, 41–42; see also Special Access
Order, supra note 1, at 10,558–63, 10,572.
61 For a useful review of the theory, see chapters 1 and 3 and the appendix on price caps
in Kenneth Train’s book, OPTIMAL REGULATION. See TRAIN, supra note 55, at 19–67, 95–
113, 317 app.
62 Id. at 20–21.
63 Id. at 61.
64 Id. at 52.
65 Gregory J. Vogt, Cap Sized: How the Promise of the Price Cap Voyage to Competition Was Lost in a Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 349, 365 (Mar. 1, 1999).
66 Id. at 366.
67 Lawrence J. Spiwak, Sending the Wrong Signals on Special Access Deregulation,
@LAWANDECONOMICS, PHX. CENTER L. & ECON. BLOG (June 22, 2012),
http://commcns.org/1ilU6Qi.
68 Id.
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The Node Decision

In the prior analysis, we ignored the decision about investments in the wire
center or other network node to which the branches attached. If the node does
not exist and so the investment is incremental, then the expected profits from
the sale of branches off the node must be sufficient to cover the node investment K. That is, for the node to exist, it must be the case that Σ(ti - si - ci) > K,
where ti is the transaction price at branch i. The reduction in welfare caused by
regulation reduces the expected total profits of the firm at that node. If these
total profits are insufficient to cover setup costs K, then the node and its associated branches will not exist. The welfare and investment effects could be
sizeable in such cases.
It could be argued that all the needed wire centers and nodes already exist
and that such investments are sunk, so that the node decision is a bygone.
While the argument has some appeal, it is not without its problems. First, if
regulators establish a reputation of slashing prices after sunk costs are incurred, then the incentive to incur such costs in the future are attenuated. As a
result, network deployment in future periods is reduced and a dynamic inefficiency is realized. Second, there are many cases where the node decision is
incremental, both in creating new nodes and in expanding existing nodes.
Telecommunications networks are constantly being upgraded, extended and
expanded, as the current trend is to push fiber deeper into the network, often
creating new nodes (perhaps to avoid data congestion). If the branches of a
node are regulated and profits are insufficient to warrant the investment, or
fear of price cuts in the future that ignore (or take advantage of) sunk costs,
then fewer nodes will exist.69 And if investments are recurring, then the “quality” of the node made be reduced, or nodes may be eliminated, if profits are
insufficient to warrant continued investments. In the end, the practical relevance of the node decision for policy is an empirical one, and beyond the present scope.
Notably, as much of the debate today regarding broadband deployment is
about expanding the availability of high-capacity circuits in rural markets70 as
it is about regulating existing circuits. Plainly, absent the sufficient subsidies to

69 Paul Levine et al., Utility Price Regulation and Time Inconsistency: Comparisons
with Monetary Policy, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 447, 449 (2005).
70 Lawrence J. Spiwak, The FCC’s Special Access Fiasco: No Data and Wrong Policy
Questions, @LAWANDECONOMICS, PHX. CENTER L. & ECON. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://commcns.org/S9KLVd.
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make such deployment profitable, creation of new capacity and new circuits
will not be served well by price regulation.
D. Posting Price with Flexibility
There is evidence, at least for some carriers, that posted prices under flexibility are higher than those under regulation. The NRRI (2009) and
GAO (2006) studies are examples, but there are others.71 While there are many
explanations for these price differences, it is worth observing why this might
occur in light of our theoretical framework.
Welfare is largest under pricing flexibility because bargaining is possible, so
that all transactions occur that produce gains from trade. If we consider a
posted price as a first offer, then from a practical perspective we should expect
the posted price to be high. Why? Because for sellers, “negotiating up” is not
typically an option. Flexibility, then, only implies downward flexibility if a
price is posted. If many buyers are paying less than the posted prices, and there
is some evidence to support this practice, then our analysis may explain, in
part, the trend in prices.
Another explanation is that the relaxation of regulation has allowed sellers
to better exploit their bargaining power. However, this interpretation of the
data does not imply a welfare reduction, but merely a transfer between buyers
and sellers. We discuss that point in the next section.
E.

Dividing the Gains from Trade

From a theoretical perspective, in this analysis a transaction occurs when
there are gains to trade, but how those gains are distributed between buyer and
seller is another issue. There are many potential outcomes of the bargaining
process. In the Nash Bargaining Solution, the gains will be split equally between buyer and seller; this arises, in part, from the assumption of symmetric
bargaining power.72 If bargaining strength is not symmetric, then other distributions can occur.73

71 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI. Inc., Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R 18,433, 18,449–50
(Nov. 17, 2005).
72 John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
48, 48–49 (1950); Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176, 186 (1986).
73 Nash, Jr., supra note 72, at 48–49; Binmore, supra note 72, at 186–87.
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In this light, our analysis suggests that much of the debate over pricing
flexibility is simply a squabble over the distribution of rents. A review of the
pro-regulatory arguments suggests that this distributional issue is prevalent, if
not driving. Our analysis shows the profound error in this logic. For every $1
in gains transferred by price regulation from seller to buyer, not only does the
seller lose $1, but there is an additional welfare loss. Making the buyer $1 better off makes others more than $1 worse off. So, while distributional concerns
may be legitimate, the cost of implementing a transfer of wealth from buyer to
seller is high, and necessarily higher than the benefits. In other words, the
regulator may worry about distribution, but doing something about it is probably too costly.
F.

Comparison to the Textbook Monopoly Case

We recognize that our findings may be surprising and possibly even confusing. Clearly, our claims are not those typical to discussions on regulation,
which in the U.S. are consistently motivated by the familiar, textbook variable
quantities monopoly framework with atomistic (or many) buyers.74 This scenario is not applicable to high capacity services.75 It is important to recognize
the role that the indivisibility of the objects being traded plays in this analysis,
since it is not the “textbook” case of market power.
In the standard treatment, whenever both market power and variable quantities exist, there is always the potential for inefficient equilibria due to the inability of the party with market power to extract surplus from otherwise socially beneficial transactions. Put simply, when only one price is charged and
quantities are variable, output is reduced to raise prices and profits, creating
welfare losses. Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates this standard, textbook case of
monopoly with variable quantities: The monopolist faces demand curve D and
produces the item at marginal cost MC. The welfare maximizing output is QC,
which is sold at price PC, where price is equal to marginal cost. This is also
the perfectly competitive equilibrium. A profit-maximizing monopolist prefers
price PM and reduces quantity to QM to achieve it. The area labeled T is the
74 Regulation
of
Natural
Monopoly,
BOUNDLESS
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://commcns.org/1kiPrnc.
75 We applied this variable quantity framework in an econometric analysis of pricing
for DS0 circuits in our paper. Set It and Forget It?, supra note 7. These smaller circuits may
be more sensibly analyzed in this framework, since they are low priced and low capacity
services for which transaction-specific negotiations are unlikely. Id. It seems clear, however, that high capacity circuits to cell towers cannot be evaluated in a variable quantities
framework. Id.
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transfer from buyers to seller and is equal to profit, and the triangle D is the
deadweight loss of monopoly, or the welfare that neither buyer nor seller capture. The area D represents the loss to society of market power, and it is this
loss that justifies regulatory intervention.
Here, the monopolist holds back output in order to raise price and increase
profits. But, for every $1 of higher profits, consumers lose more than $1 of
surplus. The gain to the monopolist is a transfer from buyer to the seller (rectangular area T in Panel A), but there is also a deadweight loss of welfare that
is uncaptured by any market participant (triangle D in Panel A), since price is
set above marginal cost. Consumers lose T + D, but the monopolist gains only
T. At the monopoly price, beneficial trade is possible since buyers are willing
to pay more than costs, but such transactions are lost when the monopolist sets
a single price to maximize profit. (Importantly and rarely acknowledged is the
fact that monopoly is not inefficient, per se; rather, a monopolist charging a
uniform price is inefficient.76 If the monopolist can charge each buyer its reservation price, then welfare is maximized, though captured completely by the
monopolist.)
Figure 2. Textbook Case of Monopoly and Regulation
Panel A: Variable Quantities

Panel B: Indivisibility
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In this textbook case, price regulation aims to reduce the monopolists’ price
in an effort to capture a portion of this deadweight loss. For every $1 reduction
in price, more than $1 is gained by consumers (a part of T is transferred to

76 Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, Costly Price Discrimination, 99 ECON. LETTERS
206 (2008).
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buyers, and they also gain a part of D), so regulation makes sense, at least in a
naïve, textbook analysis. Of course, regulation is neither costless nor perfect,
and these realities must be considered when evaluating intervention in the real
world. In many cases, the distortions resulting from regulation exceed any welfare gains from regulatory action since regulators are imperfect and frequently
politically motivated.77
With bilateral monopoly and variable quantities, the case is more complex,
but there is no ex ante assumption that the outcome will be jointly profit
maximizing, or otherwise efficient.78 But, the failings of the bilateral solution
to obtain an efficient outcome largely vanish when there is a single unit of an
indivisible good exchanged, such as a channel termination. In general, cooperative bargaining models, such as that of the Nash Bargaining Solution, take
Pareto optimality of the solution as an axiom.79 So left to themselves, one may
assume that the buyer and seller in any given market will, in fact, make a
transaction when there are gains from doing so, even if all the gains are captured by one party or the other. In other words, as long as there are gains to
trade available, trade will occur in an unregulated environment.
Imagine a case where a circuit exists on a farm where a cell tower has been
located. There is no party interested in buying that circuit other than the cell
phone carrier; there is only one seller (by assumption), and there is only one
circuit. The two parties agree to exchange use of the circuit, or it lays fallow.
In this case, the monopolist cannot manipulate price by adjusting quantity, or
give up lower valuation buyers to extract rents from the higher valuation buyers as in the variable quantities case. In such bargaining situations, as long as
there is a buyer with a greater value for the item than the seller, both seller and

77 See Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1450, 1451, 1454, 1487 (Richard Schmalensee
& Robert Willig eds., 1989). For example, Joskow and Rose assert that:
[R]egulation may introduce political considerations into input choice decisions. This will
apply to non-labor inputs as well as labor inputs. For example, utilities may be subject to
political pressures to buy local products (e.g., coal), rather than cheaper substitutes from
suppliers in other states, to bolster the local economy. Depending on the state, they might
also come under pressure to use unionized employees when they otherwise might not, or to
sign lavish wage agreements.
Id. at 1490.
78 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 300
(2d ed. 1980). As observed by Scherer and Ross, “We see that what happens under bilateral
monopoly depends in part upon whether the buyer or seller exercises price leadership. Neither of these leadership solutions, however, is consistent with joint profit maximization [and
the] joint profit-maximizing quantity might also be achieved if one party can successfully
pursue a ‘take it or leave it’ strategy.” Id.
79 Nash, Jr., supra note 72, at 48–49.
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buyer gain from trade. The profit maximizing solution for both is to find some
price at which the trade occurs. Otherwise, money (or welfare) is left on the
table.
Panel B illustrates the case we have here. There is but one item to trade,
with buyer value b and seller value s. If b > s, there are gains from trade. At
some price between b and s, both parties agree to trade and both will gain, and
the welfare potential (area G) will be realized. If there is no trade, both parties
receive nothing and leave the gains unrealized. Of course, the distribution of
these gains depends on where the price is set between b and s, and this decision depends on the bargaining power of the parties. If the price is set closer to
b, then the seller gets most of the surplus. If the price is set close to s, then the
buyer gets most of the surplus. For the Nash Bargaining Solution (symmetric
bargaining power), the price is set at the midpoint between b and s. But whatever the end price, welfare is maximized by trading.
If the seller has more bargaining power, then the seller will capture more of
the gains from trade and price will be closer to b than s. In the special access
debate, the debate over price regulation appears directed mainly at enforcing a
transfer of rents from the ILEC sellers to the buyers. In this bilateral framework, it is easy to see that this is the only possible explanation for dispute. As
we have shown, any effort to enforce such a transfer reduces overall welfare,
costing society more than $1 for every $1 transferred. As a result, price regulation of high capacity services, and in particular channel terminations that are
more frequently and sensibly characterized as location specific markets, should
be avoided (not only in the Top 50 MSAs, but all areas).80
Figure 2, Panel A, can be used to provide a rough analogy to the bilateral
monopoly case of Figure 2, Panel B. Though an imperfect analogy for a number of reasons, it nevertheless may help with comprehension. In the textbook
case of a monopolist selling a homogeneous output to many buyers, the welfare maximizing solution can be obtained under first-degree price discrimination.81 That is, the monopolist sells its output to each customer at the customer’s reservation price (the highest price the customer is willing to pay).
Doing so renders the welfare maximizing quantity QC and there is no dead-

The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345.
Dirk Bergemann et al., The Limits of Price Discrimination 2 (Princeton Univ. Econ.
Theory Ctr., Research Paper No. 052-2013, May 14, 2013) (“[I]f the monopolist has complete information about the valuation of the buyers, then he can completely segment the
market according to true valuations. This results in perfect or first degree price discrimination. The resulting allocation is efficient, but consumer surplus is zero and the producer
captures all of the gains from efficient trade.”).
80
81
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weight loss. However, all surplus is captured by the monopolist. First-degree
price discrimination illustrates the idea that it is not monopoly that is inefficient, but monopoly selling at a uniform price. While roughly analogous in
that it demonstrates the problem with assuming monopoly is inefficient, per se,
there are many differences in this example and the case of bilateral monopoly
we consider. First, in the situation we examine, we do not have atomistic buyers and the good sold is heterogeneous. Further, for small purchases, the transactions costs of pulling off perfect price discrimination are likely to offset any
increase in profitability. Special access is not a “small” purchase.
III. Numerical Simulation of the Theory
We recognize that the implications of the theoretical argument above may
be difficult to grasp, particularly given the heavy reliance of policy debates on
exceedingly simple economic models of regulation. The idea that regulation
necessarily reduces welfare even if regulators are right-minded, informed, and
their actions are costless, is a strong claim. When the concepts are difficult,
numerical examples often aid comprehension. So we provide a numerical
simulation of the theory here, which is essentially a fancy numerical example.
A.

Simulation Setup

Our interest is in the effects of regulation on welfare and the number of
transactions in a setting of bilateral monopoly with the exchange of a single
good. Since investments are plausibly related to transactions, we can also
make some claims about investment levels and regulation. To begin, we assume there are 100 potential branches at some given node, and we will focus
only on this node. This setup allows us to determine how many of the branches
are served with and without price regulation. Next, we need to assign values of
bi, si, and ci, so we can decide when transactions will occur and compute the
gains from trade. For variety in these values, we generate independent random
variables to represent the reservation values for both buyers and sellers (bi and
si from above). The average of seller valuation is assumed to be lower than
buyer valuation, just so a significant number of transactions occur. These values are randomly generated from the χ2 distribution with 10 degrees of freedom for buyers and 5 degrees of freedom for the seller. The average valuations
will be closely approximated by the degrees of freedom. Consistency with the
predictions of the theoretical model is not related to the scale of the reservation
values. Lastly, we assume the cost of the transaction, ci, is a constant equal to
1.0, and this cost is actually incurred by the seller. These are the only inputs
required to simulate the theory.
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Under pricing flexibility, a transaction occurs for those branches for which
bi > si + ci. Total welfare is simply the sum of bi - si - ci across all transactions.
Since total welfare is the sum of the buyer and seller surplus, we ignore distributional issues for now. Under the benchmark case, 74 of 100 branches are
exchanged and total welfare is 462 units.
The effect of regulation is measured by evaluating transactions and welfare
at a regulated price, r*. We assume the transaction occurs only when r* > bi
and r* > si + ci, so the seller can refuse transactions. To avoid assumptions
about how the regulated price is set, we simply evaluate the number of transactions and welfare at all potential prices.82
B.

Results with Seller’s Right to Refuse

The results of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 3. In Panel A, we see
that the aggregate economic welfare with regulation always lies below welfare
under no regulation. As expected, “no regulation” dominates regulation at any
price. In Panel B, we see that the number of transactions is lower under regulation than without regulation, which was also predicted by the theory. If transactions require investments, then investment likewise will decline. This demonstration of the theoretical results confirms that regulation (of any type) both
reduces welfare and investments, if the seller can refuse a transaction.
Figure 3. Simulation Results (Seller can refuse transactions)
Panel B: Transactions

Panel A: Economic Welfare
Wel.

No regulation

Trans.

No regulation

With regulation
With regulation

Regulated price, r*

82

Regulated price, r*

We consider integer prices only, but this has no effect on the results.

2014] Market Definition & Econ. Effects of Special Access Price Reg.

263

Welfare in the unregulated state was 462 units and there are 74 transactions.
At the peak of the regulated welfare, there are 368 units and 46 transactions.
Note, however, that these figures are based on the assumed and arbitrary distributions of the simulation and are not representative of the expected welfare
losses from regulation.
C.

Results with Seller Mandate to Provide

In Figure 4 we illustrate the results under the assumption the seller cannot
refuse a transaction when the buyer is willing. As before, welfare is always
lower under regulation, which is illustrated in Figure 4, Panel A. Because
regulation can force transactions that are welfare reducing (r* < si + ci), Panel
B shows that transactions may increase at very low prices. At plausible regulated prices (those not below cost on average), transactions are typically fewer
than in the deregulated state, although this depends in part on the assumed distributions of values. However, seller profits are negative in most of these
cases, so the firm would not operate at these low prices and no service would
be sold at all. Interestingly, the seller earns negative profits at the welfare
maximizing regulated price, so welfare maximization would not be an option
for the regulator unless a transfer is arranged between buyers and sellers. But,
again, these values are based on the arbitrary distributions of the valuations
demonstrating only possibilities. The decline in welfare, whether or not the
seller can refuse transactions, is true across all distributions of reservation values.
Figure 4. Simulation Results (Seller cannot refuse transactions)
Panel B: Transactions

Panel A: Economic Welfare
Wel.

Trans.
No regulation

No regulation

With regulation

With regulation

Regulated price, r*

Regulated price, r*
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As a practical matter, the seller may find ways to avoid forced transactions,
using regulatory proceedings, litigation, procedural delays, and so forth. Resources will be spent doing so, however, so this does not alter the fundamental
result on welfare. Regulation reduces welfare. The negative and low profits at
low regulated prices also may affect node investments, as discussed above.
From Figure 4, and to some extent from Figure 3, it is easy to see that the
empirical observation that quantity rises when prices decline is not a reliable
measure of the welfare effects of regulation (in contrast to the variable quantities framework). In a situation like Figure 4, Panel B, the number of transactions fall as the regulated price rises; lower prices render higher quantities consistent with the law of demand. But from Figure 4, Panel A, we see that welfare is always lower in the regulated state. In fact, even in the regulated state, it
is possible for welfare to move in the opposite direction as quantity, as happens in Figure 4 at the lower end of the price range. Our conclusion that regulation reduces welfare and that there is no deadweight loss in the bilateral context we contemplate, cannot be discounted simply because price and aggregate
quantity are inversely related in practice. Put simply, a regulatory slashing of
prices need not improve welfare, even if quantity rises. This finding also casts
doubt on the conclusions of studies making welfare arguments based on
econometrically estimated demand curves for high-capacity services that conceptually rely on a variable quantities framework.83
D. Distribution of Gains
As we discussed in Section III.E above, the theory says nothing about how
gains are distributed between buyer and seller, only that trade occurs when
gains are positive. Much of the debate over special access pricing flexibility
appears to be related to the distribution of gains, and not some overall welfare
argument. We also noted that for every $1 in regulation-induced increase in
the profits of the buyer, there is always more than $1 reduction in the wellbeing of the seller and the rest of society. Therefore, mandated redistributions
of gains necessarily flunk the cost-benefit test.
We can demonstrate the cost-benefit calculation using the simulation. Keep
in mind, however, that the values in the simulation are arbitrarily selected.

83 Shauntian Yao & Lydia Gan, Monopoly Innovation and Welfare Effects, 4 ECON.:
OPEN-ACCESS,
OPEN-ASSESSMENT
E-J.
1,
8
(2010),
available
at
http://commcns.org/1pcfqPH.
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Size does not matter; the only question is whether the welfare costs exceed the
benefits from a transfer.
The welfare costs of the transfer are computed by assuming all gains are
captured by the seller in the deregulated state, and all gains are captured by the
buyer in the regulated state. With this assumption, the change in welfare for
every $1 in transfer to the buyer is simply the ratio of the total welfare in the
deregulated to the regulated state. Around plausible average price points, we
compute that for every $1 transfer of gains to the buyer, there is about a $1.4
reduction in the well-being of all others.84 As expected from the theory, the
costs exceed the benefits of regulation. This trade-off is a direct consequence
of the assumed distribution, and should not be considered an estimate of the
actual welfare trade-off.
IV. Conclusions
The debate over whether high-capacity services should be subject to price
regulation has raged for nearly fifteen years.85 To date, this debate has largely
focused on whether there are sufficient competitive alternatives to warrant
pricing flexibility and also on the geographic scope of any such deregulation.86
In this article, we show that under common characterizations of high capacity
services, the core components of this debate are essentially irrelevant to the
question as to whether price regulation would improve economic welfare. Indeed, if one assumes that high capacity services are provided by monopoly
providers in highly granular, point-to-point markets (as proponents of special
access regulation argue), then price regulation reduces welfare and probably
reduces investment in communications infrastructure.
Our conclusions are based on an economic analysis of the exchange of a
single good (i.e., a circuit or group of circuits) in the setting of bilateral monopoly, which is the scenario best matching the common characterizations of
high capacity services markets by FCC decisions and those seeking regulation
of these services.87 Our analysis suggests that nearly the entire body of empirical evidence and the standard conceptual arguments used to support increased
84 We compute the trade-off only at points with relatively high welfare and in the range
of plausible average prices for transactions in the deregulated state.
85 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 344.
86 Id. at 355–56.
87 See discussion supra Part II.A; see also In re Verizon Communications Inc. and
MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,449 & n.90 (Nov. 17, 2005) (concluding that a “particular
customer’s location” is the market and citing the proponents of that conclusion).
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regulation for high capacity services are irrelevant. Under the conditions assumed, regulation reduces welfare, even if regulation is costless.
Most will find these results surprising, and many will find them frustrating
or even unnerving. We stress that our findings derive from what we consider
to be a fairly standard view over how high capacity services are ordered, provided, and consumed. The implications of our results are straightforward.
First, under the conditions we describe, regulatory oversight over the provision
of high capacity services by incumbents can essentially be eliminated, without
fear of reductions in aggregate welfare. Second, there is hope that for this important class of service, the FCC can simultaneously satisfy the twin goals of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act to “promote competition and reduce regulation” with regard to high capacity services.88 We believe that policies that
would promote entry of alternative high capacity service networks, including
adjusting spectrum policy, access to poles, ducts, conduits, rights-of-way, and
facilitating demand aggregation, will cut prices for end-users by reducing the
number of locations of which there are monopoly sources of supply. Price
regulation, alternately, may discourage competitive entry by reducing expected
profits in the post-entry equilibrium.89 As always, the trade-offs must be contemplated and, ideally, quantified.
Our approach is focused upon maximizing welfare, which we believe is the
proper method for making regulatory decisions in most settings. One risk of
the regulatory state is that this balance may get lost if proponents of any one
particular policy engage in rent-seeking lobbying or advocacy. A rigorous
cost-benefit analysis focuses attention upon the overall good, and not simply
upon the effects of a proposal upon the profits of one industry segment. A
formal cost-benefit analysis of regulation helps ensure that policymakers not
become enraptured by attention-grabbing talking points and instead insist that
advocates provide a full and complete accounting of the real costs and benefits
of any proposed regulatory action that are consistent with economic theory.

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996).
We use the word “may” with intention. High capacity services are sometimes purchased as an input. As such, lower prices may encourage entry under certain conditions.
The question is empirical because there are conflicting effects (substitution and complementarity, jointly) of lower prices. See generally T. Randolph Beard et al., Mandated Access
and the Make-or-Buy Decision: The Case of Local Telecommunications Competition, 45 Q.
REV. ECON. & FIN. 28 (2004).
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